This essay relates my life story as a Jewish philosopher who was born and raised in Israel but whose academic career has taken place in the United States. The essay explains how I developed my approach to Jewish philosophy as intellectual history, viewing philosophy as cultural practice. My research evolved over time from preoccupation with medieval and early-modern Jewish philosophy and mysticism to contemporary concerns of feminism, environmentalism, and transhumanism. Through a personal life story, the essay (...) makes the case for doing philosophy in a contextual, cross-cultural, and interdisciplinary way, integrating the desire for universality and the commitment for differentiated particularity. Jewish philosophy offers a viable model for the intellectual challenges facing all people in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” program within metaethics. But is Kant best read as pursuing a constitutivist approach to meta- normative questions? And if so, in what sense? In this essay, I’ll argue that we can best answer these questions by considering them in the context of a broader issue – namely, how Kant understands the proper methodology for philosophy in general. The result of this investigation will be (...) that, while Kant can indeed be read as a sort of constitutivist, his constitutivism is ultimately just one instance of a much more general approach to philosophy – which treats as fundamental our basic, self-conscious rational capacities. Thus, to truly understand why and how Kant is a constitutivist, we need to consider this question within the context of his more fundamental commitment to “capacities-first philosophy”. (shrink)

Constitutivist theories in ethics seek to derive and justify normative ethical claims via facts about constitutive features of agency. In Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism, Paul Katsafanas uses Nietzsche to elucidate a version of the position he believes avoids worries besetting its competitors. This paper argues that Nietzschean constitutivism falters in many of the same places: it may remain vulnerable to ‘schmagency’ objections; it faces problems giving an account of the weights of reasons that adequately explains (...) why we have more reason to perform some actions than others; and it is unable to generate normativity from constitutive aims. These doubts have wider import than Nietzschean constitutivism alone, though: they give good reason to think that such difficulties arise from the very structure of constitutivist approaches. (shrink)

During his career, Ronald Dworkin wrote extensively on an impressive range of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy, but, like many of his contemporaries, international law remained a topic of relative neglect. His most sustained work on international law is a posthumously published article, “A New Philosophy for International Law” (2013), which displays some familiar aspects of his views in general jurisprudence, in addition to some novel (though perhaps surprising) arguments as well. This paper argues that the (...) moralized account of international law we might have expected is conspicuously missing from this posthumous article; with Dworkin advancing an argument based on a form of political realism instead. (shrink)

Islamic Theology, Philosophy and Law: Debating Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya. Edited by Birgit Krawietz and Georges Tamer. Studien zur Geschichte and Kultur des islamischen Orients, n. F., vol. 27. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013. Pp. viii + 583. €129,95, $182.

This paper takes a constitutivist approach to self-deception, and argues that this phenomenon should be evaluated under several dimensions of rationality. The constitutivist approach has the merit of explaining the selective nature of self-deception as well as its being subject to moral sanction. Self-deception is a pragmatic strategy for maintaining the stability of the self, hence continuous with other rational activities of self-constitution. However, its success is limited, and it costs are high: it protects the agent’s self by (...) undermining the authority she has on her mental life. To this extent, self-deception is akin to alienation and estrangement. Its morally disturbing feature is its self-serving partiality. The self-deceptive agent settles on standards of justification that are lower than any rational agent would adopt, and thus loses grip on her agency. To capture the moral dimension of self-deception, I defend a Kantian account of the constraints that bear on self-constitution, and argue that it warrants more discriminating standards of agential autonomy than other contemporary minimalist views of self-government. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: References.

Introduces the provocative questions and the arguments that philosophers throughout history have offered, from Plato to the twentieth century, including such issues as reality, ethics, and the existence of God.

Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account is the first book-length treatment of philosophical issues and implications in current cellular and molecular neuroscience. John Bickle articulates a philosophical justification for investigating "lower level" neuroscientific research and describes a set of experimental details that have recently yielded the reduction of memory consolidation to the molecular mechanisms of long-term potentiation (LTP). These empirical details suggest answers to recent philosophical disputes over the nature and possibility of psycho-neural scientific reduction, including the multiple (...) realization challenge, mental causation, and relations across explanatory levels. Bickle concludes by examining recent work in cellular neuroscience pertaining to features of conscious experience, including the cellular basis of working memory, the effects of explicit selective attention on single-cell activity in visual cortex, and sensory experiences induced by cortical microstimulation. (shrink)

In Philosophy as Frustration: Happiness Found and Feigned from Greek Antiquity to Present Bruce Silver argues that traditional philosophical views of happiness, as well as recent psychological theories of happiness, are at odds with themselves and with important accounts of a truly happy life.

"Golf day 2005 @ federal golf club, red hill." Ethos: Official Publication of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory, (196), pp. 7.

This book brings together philosophers, literary theorists, and art historians to argue for the philosophical significance of Michael Fried’s art history and criticism. It demonstrates that Fried’s analyses of absorption and theatricality, and the accounts of modernism he develops from them, can throw new light on problems in aesthetics, and questions of authenticity, scepticism, modernity, and politics. Featuring an essay by Fried and articles from world-leading scholars, this collection contributes to current debates in aesthetics, modernism studies, literary (...) studies, art theory, and both analytic and continental philosophy. (shrink)

This book brings together philosophers, literary theorists, and art historians to argue for the philosophical significance of Michael Fried's art history and criticism. It demonstrates that Fried's analyses of absorption and theatricality, and the accounts of modernism he develops from them, can throw new light on problems in aesthetics, and questions of authenticity, scepticism, modernity, and politics. Featuring an essay by Fried and articles from world-leading scholars, this collection contributes to current debates in aesthetics, modernism studies, literary (...) studies, art theory, and both analytic and continental philosophy. (shrink)

This paper defends an invariance-based account of laws of nature: Laws are generalizations that remain invariant under various sorts of changes. Alternatively, laws are generalizations that exhibit a certain kind of independence from background conditions.

Some philosophers claim to "do philosophy historically." They study philosophers of the past not just to discover what they thought, but as a way of advancing their own philosophical agendas. In this paper, I offer an account of what it means to do philosophy historically. First, I examine a number of current views of the matter, and explain why I find them inadequate. Next, I ask what kind of understanding can be gained from a study of history. (...) I do so by drawing on John Herman Randall's discussion of the "genetic method." Finally, I extend Randall's discussion of the genetic method to philosophy, and use it to explain how a study of past philosophy might teach philosophical lessons. I also ask what assumptions we must make about philosophy if we are to learn such lessons, and I argue that these assumptions are plausible. (shrink)

This book argues that the standard arguments for and against the claim that certain Hindu texts and traditions attribute direct moral standing to animals and plants are unconvincing. It presents careful, extensive, and original interpretations of passages from the Manusmrti (law), the Mahābhārata (literature), and the Yogasūtra (philosophy), and argues that these texts attribute direct moral standing to animals and plants for at least three reasons: they are sentient, they are alive, and they possess a range of other (...) relevant attributes and abilities. This book is of interest to scholars of Hinduism and the environment, religion and the environment, Hindu and/or Buddhist philosophy more broadly, and environmental ethics. (shrink)

Learn to understand the major issues, theories and problems at the heart of philosophy and watch hard-to-grasp concepts come to life.

Properly understood, Kant’s moral philosophy is incompatible with constitutivism. According to the constitutivist, being subject to the moral law cannot be a matter of free choice, and failure to c...

Philosophy for AS and A2 is the definitive textbook for students of Advanced Subsidiary or Advanced Level philosophy courses, structured directly around the specification of the AQA. Following a lively foreword by Nigel Warburton, author of Philosophy: The Basics, a team of experienced teachers devote a chapter each to the six themes covered by the syllabus: Each of the chapters include helpful student-friendly features. a list of key concepts, to introduce students to the topic bite-size sections corresponding (...) to the syllabus topics actual exam questions from previous years suggested discussion questions to promote debate text-boxes with helpful summaries, case-studies and examples an annotated further-reading list directing students towards the best articles, books and websites a comprehensive glossary, providing a handy reference point There is a final chapter on essay writing and exam preparation, designed to help students get to grips with the examination board requirements. Philosophy for AS and A2 is written by a team of expert teachers based at Heythrop College - part of the University of London - which specializes in teaching philosophy and theology. (shrink)